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Abstract 
 
The selection of application frameworks is an             
important aspect of architectural design. Selection           
often requires satisficing, that is, searching a             
potentially large space of design alternatives until an               
acceptable solution is found. There is, however, little               
help for architects in selecting software frameworks. In               
this paper we investigate the criteria used by               
practicing software architects in selecting security           
frameworks. We also propose how information           
associated with some of the criteria that are important                 
to architects can be obtained manually or in an                 
automated way from online sources such as GitHub.               
Our ultimate goal is to identify measures associated               
with these criteria that can be helpful in providing                 
support for architects to select software frameworks.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Software architecture design is the activity of       
making design decisions to identify elements that       
compose the architecture of a software system.       
Architectural design can be performed systematically      
using a method such as Attribute-Driven Design       
(ADD) [​3​]. Generally, the design of a software        
architecture is performed by reusing proven solutions       
to recurring design problems. These proven solutions       
can be conceptual in nature, such as design patterns         
[4], or they can be concrete, such as application         
frameworks. An application framework (or just      
framework) is a collection of reusable software       
elements that provide generic functionality addressing      
recurring domain and quality attribute concerns across       
a broad range of applications. There exist application        
frameworks for many problem domains including user       
interfaces, object-oriented to relational mapping     
(ORM), generation of reports, and security. An       
example of an application framework for ORM is        
hibernate . Using this framework involves including      1
several library (Jar) files along with annotations in        
certain classes so that the framework can successfully        
persist these classes in a relational database. Other Java         
frameworks follow a similar usage pattern.  
Architects generally select frameworks as part of       
the design process, and selecting an appropriate       
framework is an important design decision which may        
be costly to revert. The goal of our research is to help            
software architects make better and more informed       
design decisions, particularly regarding the selection of       
application frameworks during architectural design. In      
this paper we identify a list of criteria that can be used            
in the selection of software security frameworks. Using        
this list of criteria we surveyed practicing software        
architects to understand how important these criteria       
are to them. We then investigate how data associated         
with a subset of these criteria can be obtained from          
online sources such as GitHub to provide relevant        
information to the architects. 
 
2. Context of the study  
1 ​http://hibernate.org/ 
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 In this section we discuss the evaluation criteria we         
chose, and the frameworks we selected for our study. 
 
2.1. Criteria 
Application frameworks can be categorized     
according to different characteristics, or criteria, that       
are taken into account for their selection. We based this          
list of criteria on informal interviews with software        
architects, and later validated it with a survey, as we          
will describe in Section 3. Table 1 lists the criteria we           
selected and the meaning of each one of them.  
The criteria are listed in order of importance, as         
determined by our survey respondents (see      
http://sites.psu.edu/frameworks/survey/​). But it should    
be noted that the differences in scores from top to          
bottom were not large: the most important criterion        
was just 25% more highly ranked than the least         
important.  
 
Table 1. Selection criteria 
Criterion  Meaning 
Functional 
completeness 
The framework offers the functions 
that are needed 
Ease of 
integration 
The framework integrates easily with 
other technologies that are used in the 
project. 
Community 
engagement  
How quickly bugs are fixed 
Quality of 
documentation 
Good documentation and examples 
are available 
Cost  The framework is free or reasonably 
priced 
Usability   The framework is easy to use 
Learnability  The framework is easy to learn 
Support  The vendor or community provides 
support, answers questions quickly 
Familiarity  I or my team were already familiar 
with it 
Popularity  Lots of other projects are already 
using this framework 
Run-time 
performance 
The framework does not introduce an 
unacceptable performance penalty 
Evolution  New, useful features are regularly 
added to the framework 
 
2.2. Selected frameworks 
In this study we have chosen to focus on open          
source software security frameworks supporting the      
Java programming language and dedicated to the       
quality attribute of security. This is because the domain         
of security frameworks is rich, with many products        
available, and Java has been the most popular        
programming language for enterprise applications for      
well over a decade . Thus our chosen domain is a rich           2
one. And we chose the most popular security        
frameworks within this chosen domain. But this       
selection was simply to scope our analysis efforts. Note         
that none of the techniques that we apply are specific to           
either the Java language or to the domain of security. 
 
Table 2. Considered security frameworks  
ID 
Name and 
version  Focus  Description 
F1 
Spring 
Security  
3
(v 4.1.0)  A&A 
Highly customizable 
authentication and 
access-control framework.  
F2 
Bouncycastle  
4
(v 1.54)  CRY  Java cryptography APIs. 
F3 
JAAS  
5
(Java SE 8)  A&A 
The Java Authentication and 
Authorization Service is part 
of the Java security APIs.  
F4 
JCE  
6
(Java SE 8)  CRY 
The Java Cryptography 
Extension  is part of the Java 
security APIs.  
F5 
Apache Shiro  
7
(v 1.2.4)  A&A 
Powerful and easy-to-use Java 
security framework that 
performs authentication, 
authorization, cryptography, 
and session management. 
F6 
Jasypt  
8
(v 1.9.2)  CRY 
Java library which allows the 
developer to add basic 
2https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/ 
3 ​http://projects.spring.io/spring-security/ 
4 ​http://www.bouncycastle.org/ 
5 ​http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/jaas 
6 ​http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/ 
security/crypto/CryptoSpec.html 
7 ​http://shiro.apache.org/ 
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 encryption capabilities to 
his/her projects with 
minimum effort. 
F7 
HDIV  
9
(v 2.1.11)  WEB 
Open-source Java web 
application security 
framework that eliminates or 
mitigates web security risks 
by design for some of the 
most used JVM web 
frameworks. 
F8 
OWASP 
ESAPI  
10
(v 2.1.0)  WEB 
This is the Java EE language 
version of OWASP ESAPI 
(Enterprise Security API). 
F9 
Keyczar  
11
(v 0.71)  CRY 
Open source cryptographic 
toolkit designed to make it 
easier and safer for developers 
to use cryptography in their 
applications.  
F10 
OACC  
12
(v 2.0.0)  A&A 
OACC provides a high 
performance API that 
provides permission-based 
authorization services for Java 
applications.  
F11 
jGuard  
13
(v 1.0.4)  A&A 
jGuard is a library that 
provides easy security 
(authentication and 
authorization) for Java web 
applications. 
F12 
PicketLink  
14
(v 2.7.1)  A&A 
PicketLink provides an 
alternative to JEE Security, 
providing a rich, powerful and 
flexible API to secure your 
applications. 
 
We include standalone security frameworks and      
APIs that are part of full stack frameworks (such as          
JAAS). We exclude non-security frameworks (such as       
presentation layer frameworks like ZK) which, while       
they may include security functionality, do not       
primarily focus on security. We constrain our scope in         
8 ​http://www.jasypt.org/ 
9 ​http://www.hdiv.org/ 
10 ​https://github.com/ESAPI/esapi-java-legacy 
11 ​https://github.com/google/keyczar 
12 ​http://oaccframework.org/ 
13 ​http://jguard.xwiki.com 
14 ​http://picketlink.org/appsecurity/ 
this way to avoid making “apples and oranges”        
comparisons; that is, to avoid comparing frameworks       
with fundamentally different objectives. Table 2 lists       
the frameworks that we considered for this paper. It         
should be noted that the majority of these frameworks         
have a relatively narrow focus, as described in the         
frameworks’ homepages. This focus is typically either       
authorization and authentication (A&A - 6      
frameworks), cryptography (CRY - 4 frameworks), or       
protection of web applications against attacks (WEB -        
2 frameworks). The descriptions in table 2 come from         
the frameworks’ homepages. 
 
3. Survey of practicing architects  
To understand the criteria used by architects in 
selecting security frameworks, we created a survey 
which can be found at the following URL 
(​https://goo.gl/forms/bDT3b9yNkp4FxxCw1​). The 
survey consists of questions regarding: 
1. The participant’s background (years of     
experience in total and as architect, years of        
experience with Java frameworks) 
2. Which of the frameworks from Table 2 the        
architect is familiar with, and whether he or        
she was responsible for selecting the      
framework in a project 
3. Framework-specific questions for up to five      
frameworks, including which of the criteria in       
table 1 were taken into account when a        
particular framework was selected (these were      
multiple answer questions with answers     
ranging from “primary reason for selection” to       
“did not take into account”).  
4. How each one of the criteria in table 1 is          
evaluated (this was a free text response) 
We received 14 responses to our survey. 85.6% of         
the respondents had 10 or more years of experience in          
software development. 78.6% had 4 or more years as         
an architect or technical lead, all of the respondents had          
5 or more years of experience using Java Frameworks.         
80% of the respondents had been responsible for the         
selection of a security framework in a project where         
they worked. 
The frameworks that were more popular among the        
respondents were the following (the percentage      
indicates the relative number of participants that       
claimed they were familiar with it):  
● Spring Security (86.7%) 
● JAAS (73.3%) 
● JCE (66.7%) 
● BouncyCastle (33.3%) 
Due to limited space, we only provide highlights of the          
results from the survey but the complete results can be          
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 reviewed at the following address     
http://sites.psu.edu/frameworks/survey/​. Of these   
frameworks, Spring Security was overwhelmingly     
chosen by the respondents in 11 of the 14 responses.          
Other architects also selected JCE, JAAS and       
Bouncastle but these frameworks were only selected       
once each.  
 
4. Data collection  
In this section we present data that is collected for 4           
of the criteria listed previously: functional      
completeness, community engagement, evolution and     
popularity. These criteria were selected to explore       
different strategies of data collection from online       
sources.  
 
4.1. Functional completeness 
We measure functional completeness in terms of       
coverage of the domain. For this reason we scrutinize         
each framework to determine how many distinct areas        
of security concerns the framework addresses. Security       
tactics exhaustively define the facets of software       
security that a framework could be architected to        
address. Tactics are generic design primitives that have        
been organized according to the quality attribute that        
they primarily affect: availability, modifiability,     
security, usability, testability, and so forth [2]. Tactics        
have been used to guide both design and analysis [3]          
[9]. The way that we employ tactics here is as a kind            
of analysis: tactics describe the space of possible        
design objectives with respect to a quality attribute,        
and by determining which tactics a framework realizes,        
we get a measure of the functional completeness of the          
framework. In this way we can rank the frameworks         
according to the degree of each framework’s coverage        
of security tactics. Security tactics abstract the       
complete domain of design choices for software       
security. Figure 1 shows the security tactics hierarchy.        
There are four broad software-based strategies for       
addressing security: detecting, resisting, reacting to,      
and recovering from attacks. These are the top-level        
design choices that an architect can make when        
considering how to address software security. The leaf        
nodes further refine these top-level categories. For       
example, to resist an attack an architect may choose to          
authorize users, authenticate users, validate input,      
encrypt data, etc. Each of these is a separate design          
choice that must be implemented, either by custom        
coding or by employing a software component such as         
a framework.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Security Tactics Hierarchy 
 
By understanding which specific tactics are      
addressed by a security framework, we measure its        
functional coverage (reported as the number of tactics        
that are covered by the framework). For example, a         
security framework may specialize in providing      
encryption features and hence is only implementing       
the ‘Encrypt Data’ tactic. This means that the        
functional coverage of the framework is quite limited        
as it only covers a single tactic.  
To measure functional coverage, we first      
reviewed the published descriptions of all the       
frameworks under investigation. These descriptions     
were primarily obtained from the frameworks’      
homepages. An example is the description from the        
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 Spring Security framework: “Spring Security is a       
framework that focuses on providing both      
authentication and authorization to Java applications.      
Like all Spring projects, the real power of Spring         
Security is found in how easily it can be extended to           
meet custom requirements”. We also looked for       
additional materials such as online articles and       
tutorials. This initial review gave us an idea of the          
overall emphasis of each framework in their       
coverage. We then delved into the individual       
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that     
support specific security tactics to verify the claims        
made in the frameworks’ descriptions. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Extract of the template used to capture horizontal coverage information 
#  Tactics 
group 
Tactics 
question 
Supported
? 
Yes/No/Not 
sure 
If you answered Yes/Not Sure, please 
describe the features of the 
framework, which support the tactic 
(provide links if necessary) or 
describe why you are not sure.  
Preferably use official documentation. 
If you answered Yes/Not 
Sure, please list the packages 
in the framework API, which 
are associated with the tactic. 
Use official API 
documentation to fill this 
section. 
6  Resisting 
attacks 
Does the 
framework 
support the 
authentication 
of actors ​ ? 
 
An example is 
ensuring that an 
actor (user or a 
remote 
computer) is 
actually who or 
what it purports 
to be. 
 
Yes  Spring Security provides different 
authentication options: 
● In Memory Authentication 
● JDBC Authentication 
● LDAP Authentication 
 
http://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/
docs/4.0.4.RELEASE/reference/html/jc.
html#jc-authentication 
 
See also a list of technologies that can 
be integrated for authentication 
purposes: 
 
http://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/
docs/4.0.4.RELEASE/reference/html/int
roduction.html#what-is-acegi-security 
org.springframework.security.a
uthentication 
org.springframework.security.a
uthentication.dao 
org.springframework.security.a
uthentication.encoding 
org.springframework.security.a
uthentication.event 
org.springframework.security.a
uthentication.jaas 
 
... 
 
To ensure the consistency across our data       
collection, the information was captured using a       
template (see table 3). This template served as a         
checklist, by listing all the known security tactics. It         
also served as a questionnaire, eliciting information       
such as whether a specific tactic is handled by the          
framework of interest, the details of the APIs used to          
realize the tactic, and additional justifications for how        
a decision on a framework’s support for the tactic         
was made. 
Table 4 summarizes the functional coverage of all        
the security frameworks we considered in this study        
(Y’s mean the tactic is covered by the framework, the          
numbers F1 to F12 correspond to the frameworks        
listed in table 2). Note that in the table we omitted the            
tactics not covered by any of the frameworks we         
reviewed. Thus the tactics that are covered are the         
following: 
● T1 - Identify actors 
● T2 - Authenticate actors 
● T3 - Authorize actors 
● T4 - Encrypt data 
● T5 - Limit access 
● T6 - Validate input 
● T7 - Verify message integrity 
● T8 - Detect intrusion  
● T9 - Maintain audit trail 
 
Table 4 reveals that there are three distinct groups         
of software security frameworks. The first group       
includes frameworks that focus on cryptography.      
This group includes Jasypt, Keyczar, JCE and       
Bouncy Castle. The second group includes      
frameworks that focus on authentication and      
authorization. This group includes JGuard, OACC,      
PicketLink and JAAS. Finally, the third group       
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 includes frameworks that strive to provide a       
comprehensive set of security features including      
cryptography, authentication, authorization, and    
others in the security tactics hierarchy. This third        
group includes OWASP ESAPI, Spring Security and       
Apache Shiro. These three groups can be contrasted        
with the focus that was initially identified by the         
descriptions in the framework homepages (see Table       
2). 
 
 
Table 4. Functional Coverage  
 Resist Attacks 
Detect 
Attacks 
Rec
over 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 
F1 Y Y Y  Y     
F2 Y Y Y  Y     
F3 Y Y Y  Y     
F4 Y Y Y  Y     
F5    Y   Y   
F6    Y   Y   
F7    Y   Y   
F8    Y   Y   
F9 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
F10 Y Y Y Y Y     
F11 Y Y Y Y Y     
F12      Y  Y Y 
 
4.2. Community Engagement 
We propose three different measures to evaluate       
the community engagement for frameworks. The first       
measure is the ratio of resolved issues vs. open         
issues. Issues include reported bugs that need to be         
fixed, and feature enhancement requests. We consider       
that a high resolution ratio indicates that the        
community that develops the framework actively and       
works towards improving its quality. The second       
measure is the average resolution time (ART), that is         
the average time it takes for issues to be resolved.          
This measure is calculated by Tr(i)- Tp(i) where Tp(i)         
is a timestamp created when an issue i is posted, and           
Tr(i) is a timestamp when the issue i is resolved. A           
smaller ART indicates that the members of the        
community actively work towards quickly addressing      
issues and improving the quality of the framework.        
The third measure is the number of contributors (and         
committers). A high number of contributors also       
indicates that there is a vigorous community       
committed to the development of the framework. 
It should be noted that the calculation of these         
measures require that the framework has a publicly        
accessible issue tracking system. We used the official        
GitHub API v3 (https://developer.github.com/v3/) to     
obtain the issue tracking data in the case of Spring          
Security, PicketLink, OACC, Keyczar, ESAPI and      
Hdiv, all of which are using GitHub to handle project          
issues. Bouncy Castle and Apache Shiro use JIRA        
(https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira), which is a    
proprietary issue tracking tool developed by      
Atlassian. JIRA allowed us to export project issues as         
an Excel file. The Other frameworks, jGuard and        
Jasypt, are using sourceforge.net    
(https://sourceforge.net/), and we simply collected the      
necessary data manually. Of all the frameworks       
considered, only JAAS and JCE do not have publicly         
accessible issue tracking systems as they are       
developed as part of the Java API. 
 
 
Fig 2: Ratio of resolved issues 
 
Figure 2 shows the ratios of resolved issues        
including bug fixes and change requests (new       
features) for each of the frameworks evaluated. Here,        
"resolved" means a developer has either fixed the        
reported problem or satisfied the change request in a         
framework. We can see that PicketLink (99.20%) is        
the highest ranked security framework in terms of the         
ratio of resolved change requests. Moreover, Hdiv       
(93.33%), OACC (100% bug fixes and 72.73%       
changes), JGuard (91.49% bug fixes and 35.82%       
changes), Bouncy Castle (92.81 bug fixes and       
87.37% changes), and Spring Security (92.92 bug       
fixes and 82.04% changes) are significantly better       
than the other frameworks in their ratio of resolved         
issues. Note that PicketLink, Hdiv, and Keyczar do        
not offer ways to distinguish bug fixes from other         
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 types of change requests in their issue tracking        
system, which is why we classify them as generic         
changes (bars shown in green). 
Figure “Distribution of issue resolution time for       
the security frameworks” on the accompanying      
website (​https://sites.psu.edu/frameworks/​) shows the    
distribution of the percentage of issues resolved       
across time periods (in days) for the different        
frameworks. For example, in the case of Spring        
Security, around 35% of the issues are resolved        
between 0 and 20 days after they are raised. If issues           
found in a security framework are promptly resolved,        
ART becomes increasingly skewed to the left. For        
this measure, OACC, Hdiv, OWASP ESAPI,      
Keyczar, PicketLink produce desirable results.     
However, OWASP ESAPI and Keyczar had a       
significant portion of their issues that went       
unresolved. Therefore, our data can be interpreted as        
showing that OACC, Hdiv and PicketLink have       
higher community engagement as they have a low        
ART and a high percentage of resolved issues. 
 
Fig 3: Number of committers 
 
Figure 3 displays the results with respect to the         
number of committers for the different frameworks.       
Most of the frameworks, except for Jasypt and        
Bouncycastle are hosted in GitHub which provides       
information about the number of committers (called       
contributors). JGuard provides information about the      
committers in its homepage. Bouncy Castle, however       
does not provide clear information about the number        
of committers and this is why it is not included.          
JAAS and JCE are part of java so this metric does not            
apply for them. We can see that Spring Security has          
the highest number of contributors (158) compared       
with the other frameworks. 
 
4.3. Evolution 
In this paper we use the terms “evolution” and         
“maintainability” to denote how easy it is for a         
community of developers to modify a framework to        
fix bugs (including newly emerging security threats),       
and to add features (corresponding to new security        
requirements or variants on existing security      
requirements). While these terms are not identical,       
they are strongly related. The degree to which a         
system can be easily evolved is the degree to which it           
is easy to find the location of a bug or feature, and            
independently modify the code responsible for that       
bug or feature. A system that is not maintainable         
typically suffers from problems such as high       
coupling, low cohesion, large monolithic modules,      
and complex code. All of these characteristics inhibit        
the evolution of the system, which is why we         
consider these two terms to be largely       
interchangeable. 
For the purposes of this work we have chosen to          
examine the architectural complexity of each of our        
candidate frameworks, as measured by its      
Decoupling Level (DL)--an architecture-level    
coupling metric. DL measures how well a system's        
modules are decoupled from each other and has been         
shown to strongly correlate with true maintenance       
costs [7]. This metric can be calculated by the Titan          
tool suite [11].  
Titan takes, as input Design Structure Matrix that        
contains the dependency relations among project      
source files. In the examples presented here these        
dependency relations were generated by a      
commercial reverse-engineering tool called    
Understand. Given this input Titan clusters the files        15
and calculates the DL metric based on this clustering.         
The details of the algorithm and the empirical        
validation of DL can be found in [7]. 
Table 5 presents the results of the DL calculations         
for 10 of the 12 frameworks (we were unable to          
obtain the source code for JAAS and JCE, and so          
could not calculate their DL values). With the DL         
metric, the higher the value the better. The maximum         
DL value was obtained by JGuard (0.813) while the         
minimum value was obtained by OWASP ESAPI       
(0.304). The average DL value over the 11 measured         
projects is 0.62, which is about the average for all          
open source projects that we have studied. 
But, as with any other metric, DL values by         
themselves are just numbers and hence difficult to        
interpret; these numbers must be put into a context. In          
[7] an analysis of 129 large-scale software projects,        
covering a broad range of application areas (108 open         
source and 21 industrial projects) was carried out.        
60% of these projects were shown to have DLs         
15 http://www.scitools.com 
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 between 0.46 and 0.75, with 20% having DLs above         
0.75 and 20% having DL values below 0.46.  
 
Table 5. Results of the DL Calculations 
Project  DL 
JGuard  0.813 
Bouncy Castle  0.784 
Jasypt  0.774 
Spring Security  0.737 
PicketLink  0.675 
Keyczar  0.609 
HDIV  0.586 
Apache Shiro  0.562 
OACC  0.450 
OWASP ESAPI  0.304 
JAAS  n/a 
JCE  n/a 
 
From this data we can conclude that JGuard,        
Bouncy Castle, and Jasypt are in the top 20% of          
software projects, in terms of their DL and that         
OACC and OWASP ESAPI are in the bottom 20%.         
As mentioned above, DL values for JAAS and JCE         
could not be obtained. 
 
4.4. Adoption and Popularity 
Adoption and popularity are also important criteria 
for evaluating a security framework. While the 
respondents to our survey did not rank this as a major 
criterion, more widespread adoption and popularity, 
we postulate, implies higher quality, better support, 
greater likelihood of longevity, and better usability. 
Hence we included it in our survey as a factor worth 
measuring. Of course, a more highly adopted and 
popular framework may be inferior in some other 
ways, such as having less coverage than newer or less 
known frameworks.  This is, once again, why we 
have chosen orthogonal measures of framework 
quality in our evaluation method. 
We used Stack Overflow    
(http://stackoverflow.com) to quantify the security     
frameworks’ adoption and popularity. This website is       
the most popularly used platform by programmers to        
discuss technical issues, in the form of Questions and         
Answers (Q&A). We conducted our searches by       
using the official names of security frameworks as        
keywords on the Stack Overflow website, but some        
name variants were also used. For example, we        
employed several combinations of keywords--such as      
‘spring security’ and ‘spring-security’--to search for      
postings on the Spring Security framework. Also, we        
used the advanced search option ‘answers:1..’ to filter        
out questions without answers, as we consider these        
as less relevant. The number of matches to our         
queries is the number questions posted regarding       
each security framework. We believe that this is a         
reasonable approximate measure for the adoption and       
popularity of a framework.  
Figure 4 shows the overall results for the        
Adoption and Popularity criteria. Among the security       
frameworks evaluated, Spring Security is by far the        
most popular with 10453 questions on      
StackOverflow. 
 
Figure 4: Number of questions on Stack 
Overflow  
 
5. Discussion  
In this section we analyze the results presented in         
the previous sections and we discuss threats to        
validity. 
 
5.1. Analysis of results 
The data in section 4 shows that it is possible to           
gather data associated with the criteria presented in        
section 2 from online sources using a variety of         
strategies. We believe that the data that we collected         
could be useful to practicing architects in selecting a         
security framework, and most of this information can        
be obtained at low cost, in terms of effort. 
Ideally, we would like to gather and process data         
automatically for all of the criteria, but some of these          
criteria are difficult to measure by gathering online        
information or by direct analysis, and some require        
human intervention. Criteria whose data is difficult to        
obtain purely from online sources include Ease of        
Integration, and (total) Cost (of ownership).      
Functional completeness requires manual data     
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 gathering and processing. While it would be possible        
to create a tool that performs text analysis of the          
frameworks’ homepages and identify keywords that      
can be connected to specific tactics (such as        
“authorization”), this is currently outside the scope of        
our research, and the feasibility and precision of such         
an approach is unknown. On the other hand, data for          
criteria such as Community Engagement, which is an        
important criterion for architects, can be gathered in a         
relatively simple and automatable way, based on       
publicly available information, as we have shown.       
And other measures, such as maintainability scores,       
can be fully automated. 
 
5.2. Threats to validity 
Some threats to validity of the work presented in         
this paper include the possibility of having a        
sampling bias with respect to the frameworks we        
selected. Security is a quality attribute that is        
addressed directly by frameworks but other quality       
attributes such as performance or availability are not        
directly addressed by specific frameworks; that is, we        
are not aware of many ‘performance’ frameworks.       
We believe, though, that it is possible to find other          
frameworks for quality attributes such as usability or        
testability.  
The fact that we have only studied security may         
reflect a confirmation bias, as we may be falsely         
believing that criterion data can be collected for any         
framework that can be directly associated with       
tactics. 
One additional threat comes from the fact that the         
data for the coverage metric had to be collected         
manually in the sense that it has to be interpreted, as           
opposed to the data for the other metrics. This may          
lead to a form of experimenter’s bias. While this form          
of collecting evidence is not optimal, we believe that         
our approach is justified (and, in fact, unavoidable) in         
that the coverage metric is essential as it is the only           
one that focuses on the intent of the frameworks and          
their users.  
Another threat to validity is that, at this point, we          
have not obtained feedback from practicing architects       
to understand if they would be willing to make a          
selection decision based solely on the criteria and the         
data that we have obtained. We have tried, however,         
to leverage our extensive experience in working with        
practitioners to select criteria that we believe would        
be of use. Still, we might be subject to optimism bias           
here. 
Also, we acknowledge the fact that the size of our          
survey respondents sample is small. Even though we        
sent the survey link to several different online groups,         
we obtained what we consider is a small number of          
responses. We believe this is due to the fact that our           
questionnaire requires a fairly specific and hence       
narrow profile (Java developers who are familiar       
with, and have participated in the selection of,        
security frameworks). 
Finally, not all of the data can be accurately         
obtained in a fully automatic way. One of our goals          
in this work was to automate as much as possible of           
the measurement process, requiring only easily      
obtainable, widely used project data. For example, to        
measure evolution, we used the DL metric, which can         
be automatically calculated using just the source       
code. But this is sometimes challenging. For       
example, it is not possible to differentiate bug fixes         
from feature requests in some of the frameworks,        
which is needed to calculate the community       
engagement metric. And functional completeness     
requires the input of an expert analyst. Nonetheless,        
we largely achieved our goal of automated       
measurement; the functional completeness measure is      
relatively straightforward and does not need to be        
repeated for each release of a product.  
 
6. Related work  
Our work is unique in the sense that there is a           
lack of research publications focused on comparing       
and evaluating software security frameworks.     
However, there have been attempts to provide general        
guidance on how to select the best framework        
irrespective of the application domain. [1] discusses       
29 criteria that can be used to evaluate frameworks.         
Although the list of criteria is useful, the collection of          
data for many of these criteria (such as “design         
patterns” or “coupling”) is not straightforward. [6]       
provides an extensive review of the evaluation and        
selection of software packages, which are complete       
software systems such as Computer-Aided Software      
Engineering tools or Enterprise Resource Planning      
systems. Similar to the previously discussed work,       
their paper proposes an extensive list of criteria to         
evaluate software packages. Although software     
packages are different from frameworks, many of the        
same criteria can be used when selecting frameworks.        
Their review, however, does not mention the       
automated collection of data associated with the       
packages, which is one important contribution of our        
work. 
The work of [5] presents an empirical study on         
the selection of open source software. By       
interviewing 16 developers from different     
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 development companies, the authors arrived at the       
conclusion that the selection process is often       
constrained by the situation (for example, company       
policies) and that the developers use a ‘first fit’ rather          
than a ‘best fit’ approach towards selection. In their         
opinion, these situations limit the use of more        
established selection methods. We believe that our       
approach may help developers avoid the ‘first fit’        
approach by providing them with means to evaluate        
different alternatives from information that can be       
gathered, for the most part, in an automated way. 
The work of [8] surveys 18 selection approaches        
for Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products.     
From these different approaches, they synthesize a       
general selection process which considers five steps       
that are: 1) Define evaluation criteria, 2) Search        
COTS products, 3) Filter results based on       
requirements, 4) Evaluate the candidates on the       
filtered results, 5) Make selection (using decision       
making techniques). Our work can be of particular        
use in step 4 of their general selection process. 
The topic of evaluating and choosing frameworks       
has also received considerable attention in the       
popular press, e.g. [10]. 
 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper we have performed a study of         
criteria that are useful to architects in the selection of          
application frameworks. Our study has allowed us to        
understand which criteria are important to      
practitioners and how data associated with some of        
these criteria can be gathered from online sources.  
At this point we have only gathered data for a          
small number of criteria and our future work includes         
identifying means to gather data for additional       
criteria, although this may be challenging for some        
criteria such as Learnability or Ease of Integration.        
Future work also includes creating a tool that        
provides support to architects in the application       
framework selection process, based on the      
information that is gathered from online sources.  
While the goals of this study are rather        
narrow--looking at the decisions affecting adoption of       
security frameworks for Java applications--the     
methodology that we have applied is not specific to         
either Java or security. This was simply our initial         
target. But we believe that the reasoning, criteria, and         
tools that we have used to collect data in this paper           
are generic. Thus we can claim that this research         
represents a first step towards creating scorecards for        
third-party components, supporting the rapid     
selection of such components.  
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